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I. INTRODUCTION
Class actions, like other forms of aggregate litigation, present a
challenge to the notion of individualism, which dominates the common
conception of civil litigation in the United States. In particular, mass
litigation creates serious agency problems and lack of participation by
individual class members in a process that may influence their rights.1
* Assistant Professor Sapir Academic College School of Law, Israel. For their invaluable advice
during the work on this project I am deeply grateful to Oscar Chase, Peggy Cooper Davis, Tom Tyler,
and Joseph W. W. Weiler. My eternal gratitude, for making this project possible, goes to Aelia
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One of the tools offered by the legislature in order to overcome these
difficulties is the fairness hearing. Fairness hearings are held when parties
to a class action reach a settlement. Before a class settlement is approved,
the court must hold a public hearing to examine whether the settlement
arrived at by defendant and class counsel is “fair, reasonable and
adequate.” 2 The fairness hearing is intended to provide any individual that
might be affected by a settlement with an opportunity to publicly support
or oppose it. 3 In the hearing, the court should serve as the guardian of the
class members’ rights and interests by considering the extent of their
representation and examining both the process through which the
settlement was reached and the adequacy of the settlement’s terms in light
of the strengths and weaknesses of the legal claims of the class. 4
Despite its potential importance, in practice, the fairness hearing is
generally considered to have failed as a procedural tool for protecting the
interests of class members and mitigating agency problems. 5 Class
members usually lack incentives to participate and oversee the work of
the lawyers. Therefore, objections to class action settlements are usually
infrequent 6 and, in many cases, not even one class member attends the
hearing. Those who do choose to participate face problems due to lack of
information and expertise that limit their ability to meaningfully oppose
the settlement. Moreover, in many cases, the court itself is involved in the
process leading to the settlement and is therefore invested and motivated
to accept the very settlement it should examine carefully. 7 This could
1. Martin H. Redish, Wholesale Justice: Constitutional Democracy and the Problem of the
Class Action Lawsuit 86 (2009); Alon Klement, Who Should Guard the Guardians? A New Approach
for Monitoring Class Action Lawyers, 21 Rev. Litig. 25, 51-52 (2002); Judith Resnik, Dennis E. Curtis
& Deborah R. Hensler, Individuals Within the Aggregate: Relationships, Representation, and Fees,
71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 296, 359 (1996).
2. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2).
3. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide other balances and safeguards to protect class
members’ rights, such as the mandatory notice mechanism (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)), or the right to
opt out (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(v), and 23(e)(4)).
4. This review is highly important because when a class action ends in a settlement, an
important feature of the legal process, namely ‘adverseness,’ is missing, thus diminishing the court’s
ability to observe the merits of the lawsuit or the work of class counsel. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.,
The Settlement Black Box, 75 B.U. L. Rev. 1257, 1270 (1995); William W. Schwarzer, Settlement of
Mass Tort Class Actions: Order Out of Chaos, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 837, 842 (1995); Sanford I.
Weisburst, Judicial Review of Settlements and Consent Decrees: An Economic Analysis, 28 J. Legal
Stud. 55, 56 (1999).
5. William B. Rubenstein, The Fairness Hearing: Adversarial and Regulatory Approaches,
53 UCLA L. Rev. 1435, 1437-38 (2006).
6. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class
Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 1529, 1533 (2004).
7. Peter H. Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling Complex Cases: The Agent Orange
Example, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 337, 337 (1986).

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol52/iss4/4

2

Zimerman: The Case of the Fairness Hearing

2018]

THE CASE OF THE FAIRNESS HEARING

1107

evoke the claim that the court’s decision in the fairness hearing is a
foregone decision meant to create the mere appearance that class members
actually have a say in the litigation process. Based on these characteristics,
scholars have come to doubt the protective nature or value of these
hearings for absent class members, describing the fairness hearing as a
“peculiar juridical moment,” 8 that lies “at best, at the periphery and not
the core of adversarial procedure.” 9
Employing a unique methodology for analyzing court transcripts,
this study offers a renewed evaluation of the function and socio-legal
meaning of the fairness hearing. Through a close examination of hearings
held in three different class actions, I examined and recorded what
actually happened when legal procedures opened up to allow specific
participation of litigants during the fairness hearing, that is, what
happened when individuals were offered the opportunity to speak freely
about the proposed settlement in a class action case, what characterized
the discourse and interactions that evolved in these communications by
absent class members, and whether this form of participation had any
impact on the outcome of the cases. The analysis of original data, studied
here for the first time, reveals aspects of the fairness hearing that have not
been discussed in the literature thus far. Based on a close examination of
the hearings, I make the claim that while the participation of individual
class members in these events may not have had a strong legal impact (i.e.,
influencing the legal outcome), it still had a significant socio-legal
meaning, in, among other things, providing an opportunity for interaction
between lay and legal actors and offering a forum for public deliberation
regarding issues of great social importance and great personal importance
to the class members.
Fairness hearings provide a venue for direct, unmitigated
participation of litigants, thus creating a distinctive forum for public
deliberation and direct interaction of legal and non-legal actors within a
formal legal setting. The transcripts of the hearings in three different
cases, presented here for the first time, provide a rare set of data in the
study of legal institutions. The transcripts record numerous accounts of
individuals who were given the unusual opportunity to speak freely about
their understanding of a legal matter. The transcripts examined here
present a substantial body of information about what individuals choose
to say before a formal court and how they express themselves in that

8.
9.
(2001).
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setting. The informality of the fairness hearing setting (there is no oath or
evidentiary constraint) produces accounts that are constrained mainly by
what the participants themselves perceive as the appropriate way to
approach the court and by what they consider to be relevant to the
resolution of the case. The transcripts hence reveal how individuals
actually conduct themselves within the legal sphere, how “real” judges
react when confronted with lay perceptions of justice and the law, and
how the legal system maintains its legitimacy in the face of the demands
of litigants.
While the right to participate—to be heard, and “have your day in
court”—is well established, the form of the legal process often fails to
provide opportunities for meaningful participation and communication by
parties involved and affected by the process. This is especially true of
mass litigation, which presents one of the least participatory forms of
adjudication.
The following analysis of fairness hearing transcripts is situated both
within socio-legal studies and mass litigation scholarship. It combines
questions concerning the actual function of the fairness hearing within the
procedural design of the class action mechanism with broader questions
concerning the participation of lay people within legal procedures. In
examining the fairness hearings, I explore the degree to which this specific
legal setting allows for a meaningful inclusion of lay perceptions of the
participants therein. Whether participation is meaningful or not is related,
firstly, to its “legal effectiveness,” meaning whether the inclusion of
participants’ perceptions has the ability to influence the outcome and
actually does influence the outcome. However, because legal procedures
serve different social and personal functions in addition to reaching legal
outcomes, the examination of participation will not be limited to this
question. The following empirical examination of the hearings, instead,
frames larger questions regarding lay participation in legal procedures and
individual participation in mass litigation through three additional
modules: voice, interaction, and deliberation.
Most directly, the question of lay participation is related to the
experiences of those individuals who take part in and are affected by the
legal process. This study is not aimed at individuals’ perceptions as such,
but rather at the way these perceptions are manifested within legal
settings. At the same time, my construction of the notion of participation
is greatly informed by the significance attributed to the value of
expression (or voice) in the psychological study of litigants. Procedural
justice research has repeatedly affirmed the importance of individuals
taking part in procedures that influence their lives, expressing themselves,
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voicing their concerns, and being treated with respect by decision
makers. 10 People want to tell their stories, but mostly, they want to be
heard. Indeed, “words are active insofar as they are employed by persons
in relationship, insofar as they are granted power in human interchange.”11
Any assessment of forms of lay participation must take into account the
relational elements of the process and acknowledge the interpersonal
meanings generated within the courtroom reality. 12 This study, therefore,
pays close attention to the types of interactions that develop within the
class action fairness hearings between judges and litigants as well as
between judges and attorneys.
Finally, in my review of the hearings, I ask questions aimed at
understanding and evaluating the degree to which these events provide
opportunities for meaningful deliberation among all participants. 13 While
courts are designed as forums of deliberation based on the idea that
substantive justice will emerge from the presentation of arguments by
both sides, both the content and the form of legal deliberation are highly
regulated and limited. Concerns regarding deliberation within the
courtroom can ultimately be reduced to the following questions: Who has
the opportunity to speak and to be heard and thus influence the decision
maker? How inclusive and responsive is the legal environment? What
argumentative forms are acceptable within the process? Owen Fiss states
that the legitimacy of the courts depends on the feature of “dialogue which
judges must conduct: they must listen to all grievances, hear a wide range
of interests, [and] speak back.” 14 This notion of dialogue is crucial in the
deliberative sense as well as the relational sense; not only does it require
that litigants are able to participate in the process, but also that there is
10. See generally John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 Calif. L. Rev.
541 (1978); E. Allan Lind & Tom R. Tyler, The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice (1988);
Tamara Relis, “It’s Not about the Money!”: A Theory on Misconceptions of Plaintiffs’ Litigation
Aims, 8 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 701 (2007).
11. Kenneth J. Gergen, Realities and Relationships: Soundings in Social Construction 47
(1994).
12. Looking at the relational, interpersonal dimensions of the legal process is informed by
relational theories in psychology, which focus on the central and critical role that connections with
others play in our lives and wellbeing. Stephen A. Mitchell, Relationality: From Attachment to
Intersubjectivity 31 (2000); Jean Baker Miller, Toward a New Psychology of Women 83 (1976).
13. Deliberative theorists maintain that decisions should not be made unless all those affected
by them have the opportunity to meaningfully participate in the decision-making process. This is the
principle of consent and true participation by the governed, otherwise defined by Habermas as the
principle of “self-determination.” Namely, that “citizens should always be able to understand
themselves also as authors of the law to which they are subject as addressees.” Jürgen Habermas,
Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy 449 (1992).
14. Owen M. Fiss, The Social and Political Foundations of Adjudication, 6 Law & Hum.
Behav. 121, 125 (1982).
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communication among all participants, which requires a shared language.
This Article, thus, explores, through the use of fairness hearing
transcripts of three different cases, the extent to which communication
between absent class members, attorneys, and the judge in the fairness
hearing context, (1) permits participants to affect the outcome of the
proceedings; (2) provides participants an important forum in which to tell
their stories; (3) contributes to effective dialogue between legal and
nonlegal actors; and (4) provides a public forum in which participants may
tell their personal or group-related stories and contribute to the historical
record and social memory of the events underlying the lawsuit. I conclude,
in part, that participation of absent class members in fairness hearings has
and will likely continue to have minimal impact on the substantive
elements of the settlement, largely because of the complexity of the claims
and the significant investment of lawyers and judges in the proposed
settlement. Nevertheless, there is value in lay participation in fairness
hearings by absent class members when the court accords respect to the
lay participants and permits relatively free expression. That value lies in,
among other things, satisfying the class members’ psychological need to
be heard; allowing participants to take part in proceedings that affect their
lives; allowing for a dialogue between legal and nonlegal actors about
what law is and what it can and cannot do; and enabling lay expression to
become part of the social meanings and historical narratives that the legal
process generates and records, particularly since class actions often
address significant social events. In short, lay participation in the fairness
hearing permits absent class members – who have so little role in the rest
of the adjudicatory process of their claims – to have a measure of input
into the truth-seeking, lawmaking, norm-generation, public debate, and
reflection over issues that are important to them and, often, are also of
public significance.
II. CASES AND METHODOLOGY
A.

The Cases

This study examines fairness hearings held in three different class
actions. The first is the Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation
(hereinafter the Agent Orange case). This was a large-scale class action
filed in 1979 by Vietnam veterans and their wives and children against
seven American chemical companies that were involved in the
manufacturing and distribution of Agent Orange—an herbicide used by
the U.S. army during the Vietnam War. Agent Orange was extensively
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sprayed in Vietnam in order to defoliate roadsides and jungle areas to
assist the military efforts of the American forces. Vietnam veterans filed
the suit claiming that their exposure to Agent Orange (which contained
dioxin, a highly toxic chemical) was causing them various illnesses as
well as physical and emotional disabilities. Veterans were suffering from
high rates of cancer and skin diseases, some fathered babies with various
birth defects, and their wives suffered from high rates of miscarriages. Yet
the Department of Veterans Affairs would not recognize their cases as
service-related. 15 While veterans were certain of the cause of their
suffering, scientific proof of the connection between exposure to Agent
Orange and physical illness was weak.
After five years of pre-trial procedures, on the day that the jury trial
was about to open in the District Court in Brooklyn, Judge Weinstein
announced that the case had settled.16 The chemical companies had agreed
to establish a fund of $180 million, which at that time was the largest
award ever to be won by a class in a mass tort case, but was also certainly
a seemingly insignificant sum given the over 200,000 class members and
the severe disabilities suffered by them.
The settlement proved to be highly controversial among the class
members. Judge Weinstein, in an exceptional order, held not one hearing
but eleven days of hearings in five different cities across the country. More
than 500 class members spoke in these hearings, which lasted from early
in the morning until late at night. Many veterans came in their old
uniforms or wearing an orange ribbon on their clothes. A study published
during the period of the hearings found that the amount of dioxin (the
deadly component) in the herbicide sprayed in Vietnam was minimal. The
New York Times published an editorial calling the veterans to take the
money offered to them and run. 17 And yet, most veterans who testified
opposed the settlement, and outside the courthouse veterans were
15. Several years after the case was settled, Congress enacted the Agent Orange Act of 1991,
which provides that veterans would be eligible for treatment for a list of presumptive medical
conditions related to exposure to herbicides used during the war. Pub. L. 102-4, 105 Stat. 11.
16. The Settlement was practically made possible, and even constructed to some extent, by
Judge Weinstein himself. On the weekend before the trial was to begin, Weinstein ordered the parties
to come to the courthouse in Brooklyn for an around-the-clock negotiation marathon. Weinstein told
the plaintiffs’ attorneys that while his heart bled for deformed children, he actually considered their
case “very weak,” and predicted they would lose and go bankrupt. To the defendants’ attorneys, he
said that the jury would probably be sympathetic to the veterans who served voluntarily and were now
sick with cancer, and of course towards their sick children. Some argue that Weinstein himself even
determined the final figure of $180 million. Wilbur J. Scott, Vietnam Veterans Since the War: the
Politics of PTSD, Agent Orange, and the National Memorial 185 (2004); see also Peter H. Schuck,
Agent Orange on Trial: Mass Toxic Disasters in the Courts 143-167(1986).
17. The Truth About Agent Orange, N.Y. Times, August 13, 1984, at A22.
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demonstrating against the settlement wearing “sprayed and betrayed”
orange t-shirts 18
I present an analysis of the last two days of hearings, held in San
Francisco, on August 23 and 24, 1984. During these two days, 92 class
members spoke, most of them Vietnam veterans and a few wives and
mothers of veterans. Sixteen lawyers participated, five of whom were
themselves veterans. Following the hearings Judge Weinstein approved
the settlement. 19
The second fairness hearing I present took place as part of the
Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, (hereinafter referred to as the
Holocaust Assets case) and generally known as the Swiss Banks case.
This class action included several lawsuits filed by Holocaust survivors
and heirs of Holocaust victims against Swiss banks, claiming that by
concealing and confiscating assets of Holocaust victims and laundering
the money obtained through Nazi looting, the banks had, in effect,
collaborated with the Nazi regime in its furtherance of war crimes against
humanity. Class members in this case resided in over 50 countries around
the world. But interestingly, due to unique features of the American legal
system, 20 the suits against the Swiss banks (as well as other Holocaust era
cases 21) were filed in American courts many years after, and far away
from, where the atrocities actually occurred. The unique role of the
American courts in the Holocaust era litigation would prove significant in
the following analysis. In the other two cases (the Agent Orange case
discussed above and the Connecticut Welfare Case discussed below),
which involved American governmental institutions, the court was at least
partly associated with the defendants. In the Holocaust Assets case, by
contrast, class members regarded the American judge and the American
justice system as, at the least, removed and unbiased, and at the most, as
the real heroes of the case.
In the Holocaust Assets case too, a settlement was reached after
lengthy negotiations. 22 The Swiss banks had agreed to pay $1.25 billion
18. Agent Orange on Trial, p. 214. See also: Veterans Speak Out on Agent Orange, NY Times,
August 9, 1984.
19. In Re Agent Orange Product Liability, 597 F. Supp. 740, 862 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
20. These features include the possibility of foreign citizens to file suites for human rights
abuses committed outside the United States; the class action mechanism; contingent fee arrangements;
a legal culture in which lawyers are willing to take such cases upon themselves; recognition of
jurisdiction over foreign defendants who conduct business in the United States; fixed and affordable
court fees and an independent judiciary. Michael J. Bazyler, Holocaust Justice: The Battle for
Restitution in America’s Courts, at xxii-xxiii (2003).
21. See In re Nazi-Era Cases against German Defendants Litig., 198 F.R.D. 429 (D.N.J. 2000).
22. Judge Korman, presiding over this case, was very much involved in the negotiations
leading to the settlement. Michael Bazyler writes: “The person most responsible for putting the deal
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to be distributed according to a plan created by the court. 23 Judge Korman
held two fairness hearings, one in New York and the other in Israel.
Following the fairness hearings, Judge Korman ordered some
modifications to be made to the settlement and eventually approved it. 24 I
present an analysis of the hearing held on November 29, 1999, in
Brooklyn, New York. About 200 people attended this hearing. Twentysix class members spoke before the court in a session that lasted the entire
day. Seventeen lawyers also testified, four of whom were themselves
Holocaust survivors.
The third case, Raymond v. Rowland (referred to hereinafter as the
Welfare Case), was a class action suit filed against the State Department
of Social Services (DSS) in Connecticut. The suit was filed by a group of
disabled recipients of various benefits and welfare programs (such as food
stamps, Medicaid, and state administered general assistance) following
the closing of one third of the social services offices in the state as part of
re-organization and reduction processes. The claims, which were based
on Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, alleged that there was
not an adequate transition plan in place to deal with the office closings
and that DSS failed to make the required accommodations to maintain
accessibility of disabled persons to the benefits and services provided by
the office. 25 For example, many class members did not own a car nor
could they use public transportation, and many had difficulties
communicating by phone or mail. Also, the additional caseload of DSS
workers (which was increased by 15%) resulted in workers not having
enough time to properly handle the needs of recipients with disabilities.
Plaintiffs sought an injunctive remedy—for the DSS to make
institutional changes in order to provide nondiscriminatory service to the
class members (estimated at more than 120,000 individuals with
disabilities). 26 The settlement itself, reached after two years of
together was Judge Korman . . . His successful efforts in both the settlement and the all-important
implementation phase of the agreement have made him one of the champions of the Holocaust
restitution movement.” See Bazyler, supra note 19, at 27-28. Judge Korman himself writes in his final
decision that he “became intimately involved in the settlement discussions that led to an agreement.”
In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 105 F.Supp.2d 139, 142 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
23. For a detailed review of the Holocaust Assets litigation, see Burt Neuborne, Preliminary
Reflections on Aspects of Holocaust-Era Litigation in American Courts, 80 Wash. U. L.Q. 795 (2002).
24. In Re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 311 F. Supp.2d 407 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
25. Raymond v. Rowland, 220 F.R.D. 173, 175 (D. Conn. 2004).
26. This lawsuit can be characterized as institutional reform litigation, seeking to bring on
systemic changes in the functioning of a large public organization. See generally Malcolm M. Feeley
& Edward L. Rubin, Judicial Policy Making and the Modern State: How the Courts Reformed
America’s Prisons (1998); Leonard Koerner, Institutional Reform Litigation, 53 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev.
509 (2008).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2019

9

Akron Law Review, Vol. 52 [2019], Iss. 4, Art. 4

1114

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[52:1105

negotiations, 27 presented a series of changes to be made by DSS,
including, for example, staff training in identifying disabilities and
providing accommodations as needed and modifications to the DSS
computer system and physical environment. A fairness hearing was held
on September 10, 2007, in which 12 class members participated. Judge
Kravitz of the District Court in New Haven, Connecticut, accepted the
settlement directly following the hearing.
B.

Methodology

This study presents an analysis of court transcripts. In analyzing this
data, I use a unique methodology which incorporates interpretive reading
with more structured methods of content analysis, which are based on
systematic categorization and coding of the data. The methodology draws
on critical discourse analysis and content analysis as well as on legal
ethnography and, in particular, the ethnography of legal discourse. 28
Unlike traditional ethnography, this data was not collected through actual
observation in the field. 29 The source of the data is the official court
transcripts, providing a word for word report of what was said at the
hearings (naturally occurring talk). 30 As presented in the transcripts,
discourse is used as evidence of individuals’ perceptions of social
interaction and social meaning. In this regard, my analysis follows the
method of critical discourse analysis in its use of discourse as a source of
evidence and as a way to better understand social phenomena. The work
further reveals how “discourse in its first sense (language in use) also
functions as discourse in its second sense (a form of social practice that
‘constructs the objects of which it purports to speak’).” 31
27. Judge Kravitz indicated in the hearing: “it’s apparent from the docket sheet, that the Court
itself while not involved in the settlement discussions, had numerous status conferences with the
parties throughout that process, the parties could and did update the Court on progress.” Class counsel,
Ms. Bergert replied saying that the Court’s close supervision over the process “was very helpful to
keep negotiations going on track because they were rather intensive and difficult.” Hearing transcript,
at 9. The docket sheet (on file with author) indeed indicates that numerous telephone status
conferences were held and joint status reports were filed along the litigation process.
28. See generally John M. Conley & William M. O’Barr, Rules Versus Relationships: The
Ethnography of Legal Discourse (1990).
29. John M. Conley and William M. O’Barr, Legal Anthropology Comes Home: A Brief
History of the Ethnographic Study of Law, 27 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 41, 45 (1993).
30. The research is also based on newspaper reports and accounts of people who attended the
hearings as audiences and on interviews I held with special masters for the Agent Orange case (Ken
Feinberg) and for the Holocaust Assets case (Burt Neuborne), who were present at the hearings and
were involved in the management of the litigation. Court documents and decisions are additionally
incorporated into the study.
31. Deborah Cameron, Working with Spoken Discourse 123 (2001).
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The main advantage in working with this sort of written account is
that it enables a close examination of the content of individuals’ accounts,
of the choices people make in speaking before the court, and of the verbal
exchanges between participants. While this investigation lacks a firsthand impression of the events, it excels in examining a clear and neutral
representation of the hearings.
The following analysis combines interpretive reading with
systematic coding of the data. These different methods complement each
other in what they reveal and in the kind of insight they yield. 32 On the
one hand, the in-depth reading of the transcripts yields insight into the
nature of these events and the nature of different incidents that occur
within them. Such a reading allows the researcher to be influenced
(perhaps even moved) by the data, and thus a new dimension of
understanding is introduced and incorporated into the study.
On the other hand, the use of systematic categorization reveals
phenomena within the text, frequencies, and relationships between
different phenomena which would not be discovered through a qualitative,
interpretive reading. And while categorization is helpful in organizing the
data, “it also deflects attention away from uncategorized activities.”33
Human behavior, individual’s accounts, or interactions often challenge
this kind of categorization, so it is helpful to complete this type of analysis
with a closer, interpretive reading.
The unit of analysis for this study is the account of one speaker. The
data set consists of a total of 156 units of analysis, representing 156
speakers (97 in the Agent Orange case, 45 in the Holocaust Assets case
and 14 in the Welfare Case). For each account I counted the number of
words spoken by the speaker, the number of interactions with the judge,
and the number of words spoken by the judge in the interaction with that
speaker. 34 I then created the set of categories according to which to
analyze the materials. Based on the grounded theory approach, the
creation of a categorization scheme was conducted while moving back
and forth between theory and data, facing the challenge of translating the
notion of meaningful participation, as explained above, into something
that can be “measured” on the ground.

32. On the use of mixed methods, see generally Sharlene Nagy Hesse-Biber, Mixed Methods
Research: Merging Theory With Practice (2010).
33. David Silverman, Interpreting Qualitative Data: Methods for Analysing Talk, Text and
Interaction 123 (2d ed. 2001).
34. At this stage, interactions with the judge were not differentiated according to their length
or substance. The number of words uttered by the judge, however, was later used as an indication for
the degree and quality of interaction.
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A preliminary list of categories was formed based on the theoretical
framework (examining lay participation around the themes of interaction,
deliberation and expression) as well as on themes and phenomenon
identified through preliminary readings of the transcripts. Based on this
list, the transcripts of two of the hearings were read and categorized both
by myself and by a co-reader. We then compared and discussed our
results. This process achieved two goals: it helped refine the set of
categories (removing ones that proved statistically insignificant and
adding ones that were identified through the reading) and confirmed the
reliability of the categories to create clear rules of inclusion for each one
of them. At this stage I re-read and categorized the transcripts of all three
hearings. 35 Once the categorization and coding processes were completed,
findings were classified through the counting of instances in each of the
categories, and using statistical analysis, different comparisons were
drawn: between lawyers and non-lawyers, between the three different
cases, and between the different judges.
The main categories used throughout the analysis include:
• Type of speaker: litigants, class counsels (including defense
lawyers), and lawyers representing individual class
members. Depending on the question the two groups of
lawyers were sometimes consolidated.
• Opinion regarding approval of settlement: speakers were
either for or against the approval of settlement, and some did
not talk about the settlement at all (coded ND—not
discussed).
• Opinion on settlement itself: This category was added as it
became clear that speakers considered both whether the
settlement should be approved and the quality of settlement.
This category was coded as: favorable, ambivalent, neutral,
or not discussed.
• Boundaries—Formal and Substantive: referring to the
enactment and enforcement of boundaries of discourse and
rules of participation by the judge. I distinguish between
formal boundaries, relating mainly to the time allotted to
each speaker,36 and substantive boundaries, which relate to
the content of speech.
35. The process described here is referred to in grounded theory literature as ‘coding stage I,
II, and III.’ See Sally A. Hutchinson, Education and Grounded Theory, in Qualitative Research in
Education: Focus and Methods 123(Robert R. Sherman & Rodman B. Webb, eds., 1988).
36. The court would usually set a time limit of five or ten minutes per speaker, a practice that
is mentioned as appropriate in the Manual for Complex Litigation (Fourth) § 21.634 (2004).
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•

Reaction to boundaries: examining whether the speaker
complied with boundaries that were set by the judge.
• Judge-Speaker Interaction: Engagement over substantive
matters and acknowledgement of other person’s point of
view, and empathy of the judge towards speaker. Substantive
issues are those concerning the merits of the case relating to
the settlement, to the process, etc. Empathy and
acknowledgement identify all instances in which a judge was
responding to a speaker on a personal level acknowledging
feelings, personal circumstances, asking personal questions,
etc. 37
In addition, the content of the speakers’ accounts was coded based
on the following subjects:
• Generating legitimacy for settlement;
• Relating to the importance of the opportunity to speak;
• Use of legal discourse or reasoning;
• Direct speech or appeal towards judge;
• Speaking about the group;
• Speaking about the “self” and about personal experiences;
• Speaking about the past;
• And discussion about what should happen in the future.
III. SETTING THE STAGE: STRUCTURE, RULES, AND BOUNDARIES
This Section discusses the procedural and substantive limits the
judges established in each case for participation at the fairness hearing and
the extent of enforcement of those limits.
Once a settlement was reached in the Welfare Case, a notice was
distributed among the class members. It read: “If You Have a Disability:
Important Information about a Court Settlement.” The notice described
the background of the case, described the settlement that had been
reached, and explained in plain language the changes it would bring about
within the DSS offices. It then went on to explain “how you can tell the
Court if you object.” The notice continued: “The Court is holding a
‘fairness hearing’ to consider whether the settlement agreement is fair,
reasonable and adequate . . . . Class members do not have to attend the

37. The rules of inclusion for this category were to a large degree provided by literature on
problem-solving or therapeutic approach to adjudication, which discusses specific ways to enhance
personal skills of judges, in their attempt to create more meaningful, respectful and empathic
connections with litigants. See, e.g., Susan Goldberg, Nat’l Judicial Inst., Can., Judging for the 21st
Century: A Problem-Solving Approach (2005).
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hearing, but may attend and comment on or object to the settlement
agreement.” Having provided details for the hearing (time and place), the
notice ended, in bold letters: “You do not have to go to the hearing or do
anything else if you do not want to object to the settlement.” 38
Judge Kravitz started the hearing by mentioning the wide public
interest in the case and the written comments he had received from class
members in relation to the settlement. He then set the ground for the
administration of the hearing: “I would like to hear from counsel for the
parties in support, they filed a joint motion for approval of the
settlement . . . but then I’m willing to listen to and take comments from
others who may be interested in commenting on the settlement.” 39 Judge
Kravitz then introduced two limitations on the participation of class
members. First, due to the large number of people who might wish to
comment, he asked that the speakers limit themselves to three minutes
each (a shorter time-frame in comparison to what was allowed in the two
other hearings). And second, more substantially, the judge asked people
to:
. . .focus their comments on the settlement agreement itself and my
inquiry at this point, which is a twofold inquiry, which is first to ensure
that notice has been provided to class members, reasonable notice; and
secondly, to make sure that the settlement agreement’s terms are fair and
reasonable and adequate for the class members. 40

Judge Weinstein, presiding over the Agent Orange hearing, and
Judge Korman at the Holocaust Assets hearing, did not define boundaries
concerning the subject matter of the hearings or the content of
participants’ accounts. Both judges stressed, however, the time limits,
alongside the importance of hearing everyone who wanted to have an
opportunity to be heard. Judge Weinstein, arriving at the San Francisco
hearing after nine days of hearings in four different states, said:
Good morning, everybody. It’s a great pleasure for me to be here in San
Francisco, although not under the happiest of occasions.
We have heard almost 400 witnesses up to now, and I have a list, which
is growing rapidly, of those who wish to be heard in San Francisco. I’m
going to try to hear everybody who wishes to be heard. I’m going to

38. Citations are from the notice published by the court prior to the hearing (on file with
author).
39. Transcript of Record at 3, Raymond v. Rowland, Fairness Hearing, September 10, 2007,
New Haven, Connecticut (file with author) [hereinafter Welfare hearing].
40. Id. at 3.
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work as late as possible tonight, if necessary.
I’d like to ask you to limit your remarks to five minutes. . . . although I
know some of you have been waiting for a long time to express your
views on these matters and to ventilate some of your frustrations, we do
want everybody to have an opportunity. 41

Judge Korman opened the Holocaust Assets hearing saying that it
was “an honor and privilege for me to have participated in this case and
to be here this morning to listen to you and hear your views about the
settlement.” He then set the course of the hearing: “We’re going to first
hear opening statements from counsel, and then I will listen to everyone
who has signed up to speak. We’ll give everyone ten minutes. We’ll
continue for as long as we can and if need be, we’ll continue tomorrow.” 42
It seems, then, that in this particular setting where most formal
boundaries of participation are removed, the main limitation on
participants was the time frame for each account. It should be noted,
though, that while the Agent Orange and Holocaust Assets hearings took
all day, the Welfare Case hearing lasted less than two hours.
Once the rules of participation were set, it is interesting to examine
the manner of their enforcement. We find throughout the hearings 25
instances in which a judge asked a particular speaker to end his account
because time had expired. Interestingly, although lawyers were speaking
significantly more than litigants, in terms of words per speaker (see Table
1), only 6 of these 25 instances were directed towards lawyers. 43
In the Holocaust Assets hearing there was practically no enforcement
of time limits. In the Welfare Case hearing there was a single instance of
enforcement of time limits. Additionally, after nine class members had
testified and as others were waiting for their turn to speak Judge Kravitz
said, “Hopefully we can begin to bring this to an end at some point.” 44 It
is interesting to see that while Judge Kravitz set the shortest time limit for
each account, he was the judge with the largest number of interactions
with participants (see Table 1, Table 7).
Twenty-four of the time enforcement instances took place within the
Agent Orange hearing (Table 7), perhaps because it was the hearing with
the greatest number of speakers and lasted the longest. Additionally, and
41. Transcript of Record at 4-5, In re Agent Orange Product Liability, Fairness Hearing,
August 23 and 24, 1984, San Francisco (file with author) [hereinafter Agent Orange hearing].
42. Transcript of Record at 3, In re Holocaust Victims Asset Litigation, Fairness Hearing,
November 29, 1999, Brooklyn, New York(file with author) [hereinafter Holocaust Assets hearing].
43. This ratio is not that significant if we consider the total number of lawyers speaking
compared with the number of litigants.
44. Welfare hearing, supra note 39, at 47.
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this might be a result of the audience’s reactions in this hearing, the Agent
Orange hearing was also the only one in which we find enforcement of
other rules of participation. Throughout the hearing the crowd kept
applauding different speakers. The first few times there was applause, the
judge tried to stop them, “I know this is a highly emotional matter for
many of you, but, please, this is a courtroom, not a public meeting.” 45 But
applause would often continue without further reaction from the court.
Another example of Judge Weinstein’s need to address participant
behavior was when a woman, who had already testified in the Chicago
hearing, insisted on speaking again. The judge refused to allow it. “This
is a courtroom. I will control my court,” Weinstein said repeatedly. 46
When the woman refused to sit down, the judge warned her that she would
be held in contempt of court.
Challenges concerning the relevancy of speakers’ accounts were
very few. Overall, it seems that most of the speakers in all hearings could
speak freely about any issue without being interrupted by the judge. As
Judge Weinstein told a veteran who asked whether it would be permissible
to read from a newspaper article during his account, “you can use your
time anyway you wish.” 47 This lack of enforcement regarding the subject
matter of individuals’ accounts is not surprising given the broad and
somewhat vague definition of what is “fair, reasonable, and adequate”
from a legal perspective. Even though more than one-quarter of the
speakers (41 speakers, table 2) did not disclose their personal stance visà-vis the settlement, there were only a few instances in which speakers
were directly asked by the judges to express their opinion. Only Judge
Kravitz, in the middle of the Welfare Case hearing, asked speakers to
comment “on the terms of the settlement agreement, if I could focus
attention on that, the task that I have today is to decide whether this
particular settlement agreement is a fair and reasonable one for the lawsuit
that was brought.” 48
There were only seven instances of challenges to relevance—three
in the Welfare Case hearing and four in the Agent Orange hearing. All of
these challenges referred to speakers’ talking about topics beyond the
scope of the case. For example, Judge Kravitz’s reply to a class member
who was speaking about the question of the level of welfare benefits was,
“Many individuals wrote to me about their concerns about overall levels
of benefits, and I am certain that that is an important concern. This
45.
46.
47.
48.

Agent Orange hearing, supra note 41, at 35.
Id. at 167.
Id. at 276.
Welfare hearing, supra note 39, at 36-37.
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particular lawsuit was not about that issue.” 49 Another example is Judge
Weinstein’s reply to an attorney who was speaking about a need for an
injunctive relief to stop the use of dioxin. “That’s beyond the scope of this
litigation. You know that as a lawyer. This is not a political statement. . . .
That problem has to be addressed to the Congress and to other regulatory
agencies. This is a court.” 50
None of the three judges ever raised the issue of relevance with
regard to personal experiences and feelings. At times, though, it seems
that a formal boundary was used to end a highly personal story, as the
following example shows. “Class member: [. . .] The effect that it’s had
on me has been devastating, in terms of in three years I probably made
love three times to my wife. Court: Could you bring your statement to a
conclusion?” 51
The lack of enforcement regarding the relevance of speech resulted
in many accounts that were highly personal yet unrelated to the settlement.
Such accounts might not facilitate the court’s mission of evaluating the
settlement, but this expanding of the boundaries of relevant discourse is
nonetheless revealing. It reveals the real concerns of the litigants, 52 and
how they interpret the case and the role of the court in adjudicating it.
IV. THE FUNCTION OF THE HEARINGS I: DIALOGIC VERSUS
LEGITIMIZING EFFECT
All three hearings had a similar structure: the first to speak were class
counsel, who presented the settlement and arguments for its approval.
Only then did the class members’ testimony begin along with the
testimonies of lawyers who directly represented individual class
members.
At the Welfare Case hearing, both Ms. Bergert, class counsel, and
Mr. Barber, representing the defendant, provided accounts that were
aimed at defending the agreement itself as well as the process through
which it had been achieved. Reading their accounts, it seems as though
they were addressing two distinct audiences at the same time: the judge
49. Id. at 46.
50. Agent Orange hearing, at 376.
51. Agent Orange hearing, at 311.
52. When litigants speak about details that are not legally relevant, it seems that they do so not
because they do not care about legal relevancy, but because they have different, broader perceptions
of what counts as legally relevant. Conley and O’Barr make a similar observation in their study of
small claims court litigants. “The most significant practical question faced by informal court litigants”
they write, “is whether their accounts will satisfy the court. The strategies that they employ in their
efforts to meet this burden reflect their varied understandings of the law.” Conley & O’Barr, supra
note 28, at 44.
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and the class members. To the court, they focused on evaluating the
settlement according to the legal factors for review of a settlement in a
class action. To the public, they presented the original goals and scope of
the lawsuit, and they highlighted the benefits of the settlement against the
alternatives and consequences of not accepting it. The message to the
audience was that the accomplishments of the settlement should be
measured against the limited scope of the case and not against the broad
range of failures and problems they had encountered with the DSS or
difficulties faced by people with disabilities in general. Judge Kravitz
himself conveyed a similar message in his closing statement, explaining
his decision to approve the settlement:
This agreement does not solve every problem that exists in the state or
every problem that exists for disabled people or, indeed, every problem
that exists in DSS as an agency.
But this lawsuit was about accommodation and access . . . and I think
everybody can be satisfied that this settlement is going to go a long way
to enhancing that. 53

Put differently, attorneys, as well as the court, used the hearing to
enhance the legitimacy of the settlement by introducing to the class
members the realities of what can be achieved through this specific
litigation. Another way of demonstrating the legitimacy of the settlement,
demonstrated by the judge himself, was to highlight the efforts and
credentials of the attorneys. The judge congratulated the lawyers on their
work in this case on four different occasions throughout the hearing.
The Holocaust Assets hearing also started with the testimony of class
counsel. Their accounts were aimed mainly at the audience while
defending the settlement in different ways. The first speaker, Mr. Ratner,
emphasized the worldwide interest in the settlement and the widespread
support therein. He provided figures indicating that very few comments
and objections were received from members of the class.54 The second
speaker, Mr. Swift, who literally turned his back to the judge in order to
face the audience, also talked about the “overwhelming support for the
settlement and the great good that this settlement can accomplish.” 55
Voicing a pragmatic approach, which characterized many of the accounts
in this hearing, he concluded: “[h]ad we not settled this case, survivors
and their heirs were in jeopardy of receiving nothing.” 56
53.
54.
55.
56.

Welfare hearing, supra note 39, at 56.
Holocaust Assets hearing, supra note 42, at 7.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 8-9.
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If in the Welfare Case hearing we saw how the court was
complimenting the attorneys on both sides for their work, here we see
class counsel and defense counsel complimenting themselves and each
other. For example, leading class counsel Burt Neuborne related the
requirement that there be arm’s-length adversarial bargaining, saying “I
have bruises on my body that will demonstrate the arm’s-length and
adversarial bargaining that went on in this case. We bargained for 18
months, as vigorously as I have ever seen negotiations carried out.” 57 Mr.
Witten, the defense attorney, addressed the class members in the audience
to say that “these lawyers . . . have given you a set of champions that could
not be matched in any other courtroom, in any other case.” 58
The Agent Orange hearing in San Francisco began similarly with two
attorneys from the plaintiffs’ management committee. Both of them talked
directly to the veterans and provided a very detailed review of the legal
questions brought up by the case and the difficulty to legally prove the
veterans’ claims. Interestingly, Judge Weinstein interrupted both of them,
asking them to end their statements so that the class members could be
heard. The second speaker, class counsel Mr. Moyer, stated as follows:
I come here today to spell out for the Court and for the veterans in
particular who have gathered here, some of the real world
considerations, the cold, hard facts which have led to this proposed
settlement, and the realities, and based upon these realities to urge that
this settlement be approved.

[. . .]
I think it is important that you, the veterans, understand the risks of our
case, the risks both of the law and of the facts of the lawsuit which make
this settlement the only rational course to follow. 59

There were shared themes in the accounts of class counsel in all the
three hearings. They all used the hearing to generate legitimacy for the
settlement among class members themselves. All three judges in these
cases were considerably involved in the course leading towards the
creation of the settlement agreements. 60 Given such involvement on
behalf of judges, it is not surprising that class counsel focused their efforts
on convincing the class members themselves, rather than the judge, that
the settlement was indeed fair and reasonable, and that it was in the best

57.
58.
59.
60.
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interest of the class that it be approved by the court.
In a sense, and again given the involvement of judges in the creation
of the settlements, the hearings could be thought of as taking place in a
post-law state. It seems that on the eve of the approval of the settlement,
all legal actors had given up on a trial and had given up in fact on
adjudication in its traditional sense. It could be argued, therefore, that the
fairness hearings make use of a participatory framework in order to
legitimize controversial or unpopular outcomes. It could also be argued
that by doing so, the hearings convey the actual lack of participation and
lack of party control, which in fact characterizes the class action process. 61
Such sentiments are expressed, for example, in one Vietnam veteran’s
description of the hearings in the Agent Orange case as a traveling
circus. 62 Or, to quote another speaker, the hearings were “a sleight of hand
designed to convince veterans that they had a voice in the out-of-court
settlement.” 63
Fairness hearings are mandated by law and judges must hold them.
Yet judges do have a lot of discretion in deciding how to conduct the
hearings. It seems clear that in the Agent Orange case, the need to
legitimize a controversial settlement before the class played a role in
Judge Weinstein’s decision to hold the hearings across the country. Ken
Feinberg (who was special master in the case) mentioned in an interview
several reasons leading to Weinstein’s decision, among them the notion
that in such a case it would be appropriate to allow people the opportunity
to unburden their hearts and participate. But there were also political
reasons—seeing the hearing as a way of legitimizing the settlement before
the class members (as well as before the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit). Additionally, according to Feinberg, Weinstein
believed that by holding the hearings he would minimize the number of
people who would opt out. 64
Another explanation for the decision to hold the hearings, and
perhaps also for the manner in which they were held, is provided by Judge
Weinstein himself. In an article he wrote ten years after the Agent Orange
hearings, he stated as follows:

61. This argument echoes a more general concern that a focus on procedural values might help
authorities legitimatize decisions that are not substantially fair or just. See, for example, Bryant G.
Garth & Austin Sarat, Justice and Power in Law and Society Research: On the Contested Careers of
Core Concepts, in Justice and power in Sociolegal studies 1, 10 (Bryant G. Garth & Austin Sarat,
eds., 1998).
62. Gerald Nicosia, Home to War: A History of the Vietnam Veterans’ Movement 569 (2001)
63. Fred A. Wilcox, Waiting for an Army to Die: The Tragedy of Agent Orange, at xx (1989).
64. Interview with Ken Feinberg, New York, May 8, 2008.
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Agent Orange presented similar problems [to asbestos litigation]. People
were
deeply
affected—perhaps
physically
and
certainly
psychologically—by exposure to the chemical. Many of the veterans in
the Agent Orange case chose not to marry, and when they did marry they
chose not to have children, because they were concerned that their
children would be afflicted. The medical evidence did not justify these
fears. But it is fear, as much as medical evidence, that brings plaintiffs
into courts; we must deal with perceptions as well as facts. 65

We should ask, therefore, whether these features of the hearings
imply that a priori the hearings could have no real impact on the outcome?
And furthermore, do they trump any possibility for a meaningful dialogue
to develop throughout the hearings? In other words, we should ask
ourselves whether dialogic and defensive (or legitimizing) features are
exclusionary of each other. In order to address this question, one should
take a closer look both at the opinions expressed in the hearings, their
impact on the outcome, and their impact on the kind of dialogue that
developed therein.
While all three hearings eventually led to an approval of the
settlement by the court, the three cases significantly varied with regard to
participants’ opinions about the settlement. In the Holocaust Assets
hearing, 35 speakers supported the approval of the settlement and 9
speakers opposed it. In the Agent Orange hearing, only 16 speakers
supported the settlement, 47 opposed it and 34 did not disclose an opinion
regarding approval of the settlement. Finally, in the Welfare Case hearing,
7 speakers supported the settlement, 1 opposed it and 6 speakers (almost
half the participants) did not disclose their opinion. (See table 2, figures
include lawyers and litigants). Only in the Agent Orange hearing,
therefore, was there actually a significant amount of opposition to the
settlement voiced throughout the hearing.
When we distinguish between the question of whether a speaker was
for or against the approval of settlement and the separate question of his
or her opinion of the settlement itself, we reveal that participants’ attitudes
towards the settlement were more complex than simply being for or
against it. There was often a discrepancy between the participants’ view
of the settlement and their ultimate opinion whether to support or oppose
it. Approximately one third of the speakers in all hearings (50 speakers,
table 3) were ambivalent in their evaluation of the settlement. Only 25 of
the speakers who supported the approval of settlement (examined in all

65. Jack B. Weinstein, An Introduction to Who’s Who in Mass Toxic Torts, 80 Cornell L. Rev.
845, 846 (1995).
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cases) were also favorable towards the settlement. Another 25 speakers
who supported the settlement were actually ambivalent in their evaluation
of it. Ambivalence was less common among those who opposed the
settlement (11), and those who did not disclose an opinion of it (14). This
reveals a complexity in individuals’ opinions, which transcends the need
for a decisive binary outcome at the end of the hearing. Whether a
settlement had to be approved or disapproved and whether it was fair or
just, were viewed as separate issues altogether.
A prototypical manifestation of this complexity would be the
pragmatic approach that typified the opinions of many of the speakers at
the Holocaust Assets hearing. Across the board, every speaker—lawyer
or litigant—who supported the Holocaust Assets settlement explained it
in pragmatic terms. They acknowledged the fact that the settlement was
not perfect, rather far from it, and that it could not be viewed as fair. “[S]o
this is not a fair deal, considering for how many people they did it,” 66 or
just “[W]e certainly cannot ask at this point for justice.” 67 But despite
these reservations, the settlement was to be accepted for practical reasons,
mainly because of the condition of many of the survivors who were mostly
elderly and poor, and delay was not in their best interest. 68 The notion that
was shared by a great number of speakers was that the settlement was to
be approved because this was the most that reality and the law could offer
them:
The words fair, just, reasonable, equitable have no real meaning when
applied to the Holocaust. There needs to be a new terminology, a new
set of words, a new definition that could adequately comport to what the
Holocaust means to our time and to the history of mankind. But until
that is created, having to live with the terminology that exists, we
endorse this proposal as being real, even if it is not the ideal. 69

Going back to the question of the impact of participation on the
outcomes of the cases, manifestations of the complexity of participants’
views could be meaningful, because while judges were to decide whether
or not to approve a given settlement, they could also order its
modification. In this respect, opinions and views of speakers could have
66. Holocaust Assets hearing, supra note 42, at 119.
67. Id. at 108.
68. The practical concerns were real and acute. “By the time the first payments went out in late
2001, many of the survivors who joyously hailed the settlement in mid-1998 had died while waiting
for their check. Others just gave up, exasperated not only by the numerous delays but also with the
complicated forms they were made to fill out in order to receive the settlement proceeds.” Bazyler,
supra note 20, at 30.
69. Holocaust Assets hearing, supra note 42, at 59-60.
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been incorporated into the settlement by having it amended. This was
done, though, only in the Holocaust Assets case, where we actually find
the one single clear indication of a fairness hearing having a direct impact
on the final outcome of the case with regard to the question of the rights
of owners of looted works of art. 70
There was one other example throughout the hearings of a hearing
having a practical impact on the litigation process: towards the middle of
the second day of the Agent Orange hearing, and after many speakers had
complained that members of the class were not properly informed of the
case and of the settlement or of their own rights with regard to the
settlement, Judge Weinstein announced that he would postpone the
deadline for filing the forms to be included in the settlement, a statement
which elicited applause from the audience.71
Occurrences of a direct impact of the hearing were certainly
infrequent. At the same time, these two examples provide an important
demonstration of the actual, as well as potential, benefit of the public
hearing. These examples show how the participation of class members can
help in bringing before the court new information that was not before it
prior to the hearing and new information that members of the class have
better access to. Participation also helped in raising issues that were
overlooked by the negotiating attorneys who created the settlement.
If meaningful participation is to be assessed solely according to its
actual impact on the outcome, then the findings presented here are limited.
If we examine meaningful participation, however, according to levels of
interaction and dialogue with the decision maker, the data reveals
interesting insights. The degree of meaningful interaction with the judge
was assessed using three different criteria: the number of words spoken
by the judge towards the speaker, engagements over substantive matters,
and acknowledgments of other persons’ points of views (OPOV).
Examining the impact of speakers’ attitudes towards the settlement
on the judges’ reactions (table 9), we see that judges spoke significantly

70. During the hearing, several lawyers brought up concerns regarding claims for looted works
of art still kept in Switzerland, claiming that the settlement, unintentionally, deprived the legal rights
of the rightful owners of these works of art. For example, see accounts of Mr. Goldstein and Ms.
Weber, who represented a European body dealing with all matters relating Nazi looted art and cultural
property. Holocaust Assets hearing, at 66-82. During the hearing, judge Korman discussed this matter
with the lawyers and promised to consider it seriously. Hearing transcript at 81. Following the hearing,
at the order of the court, the parties amended the settlement in order to address this problem. The
modifications that were made to the original settlement in that regard (and other modifications as
well) are stated in an amendment to the settlement, which can be found at:
http://swissbankclaims.com/Documents/DOC_20_Amendment2.pdf
71. Agent Orange hearing, supra note 41, at 317.
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more with speakers who were against the settlement than with speakers
who were for the settlement (83 words versus 27 words). Judges mostly
spoke with those who had not disclosed their opinion on the settlement
(92 words). In addition, there were significantly more acknowledgments
of OPOV towards those who were against the settlement or did not
disclose their opinion. Discussions over substantive matters were similar
with speakers who were for or against the settlement, yet significantly
higher with speakers who did not disclose their opinion. One might
conclude that those in favor of the settlement required less attention from
the judge. It could further be deduced that judges did not shy away from
disagreement with speakers. Considering the fact that the opinions of
those who opposed the settlement were never actually accepted, it is
nevertheless meaningful to recognize that these speakers had the
opportunity to engage in conversation with the decision maker over their
views.
V. THE FUNCTION OF THE HEARINGS II: THE RELATIONAL EFFECTS
The three hearings significantly differ with respect to the degree of
interaction between judges and participants (tables 1, 7). Judge Korman,
at the Holocaust Assets hearing, did not say much throughout the day and
had but a few interactions with speakers. He engaged in conversation with
class members only where clarifications were necessary and spoke with
some of the attorneys who brought up objections to the settlement. The
few interactions Judge Korman did have were engagements over
substantive matters, whereas he had almost no expressions of OPOV
(table 7). The two other judges, however, were much more dominant
throughout the hearing, often conversing with speakers and demonstrating
in general a high degree of involvement and responsiveness to litigants’
accounts.
At the Welfare Case hearing, Judge Kravitz was highly attentive to
the personal narratives: when a speaker recounted a recent improvement
in her condition, the judge responded by saying that it was “very very
good to hear.” 72 Likewise, when another speaker concluded her remarks
declaring, “I am a disabled American and I have not received any
acknowledgement,” the judge answered: “Let’s see if we can get you
some acknowledgement then.” 73 Judge Kravitz repeatedly affirmed that
the concerns brought up by the speakers were very important (even if not
always within the scope of the case), and would engage with the speakers’
72.
73.

Welfare hearing, supra note 39, at 29.
Id.at 36.
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accounts by saying “right” every once in a while.74 The judge also made
a point to thank the speakers for taking the time to come speak with him,
to write to him, and to comment about the case. Moreover, throughout the
hearing, Judge Kravitz tried to provide practical solutions to the specific
needs of the speakers. Whenever a speaker would mention a personal
condition requiring assistance from the DSS office or another authority,
the judge would urge the speaker to turn to the plaintiffs’ lawyers,
explaining that they agreed to meet with individuals, hear their
complaints, and see if they “can assist in any way and help with the
processing.” 75 He urged the DSS representative to use the jury room to
meet with those who needed personal advice: “they don’t need to meet in
the hallway – with some privacy.” 76
Reading the court transcripts provides the impression that the court
itself has become an extension of the DSS office. So much so that when
one woman told the judge “I hope you will make sure that somebody does
get back to me,” the judge had to reaffirm his role explaining that “I can’t
sort of go out and get lawyers and tell them to go find you, okay? I’m
supposed to [be] an independent impartial decision maker. What I have
asked of both sides was [. . .] to make themselves available, to listen to
any complaints that people have.” 77
Judge Weinstein, at the Agent Orange hearing, was similarly highly
dominant and interactive throughout the hearing. Given the strong level
of opposition to the settlement and the highly emotional nature of many
of the accounts in that hearing, it is interesting to examine how the judge
dealt with the pain, needs, and hopes of the veterans, when these were
addressed directly to him. It is interesting to observe the strategies
employed by the judge when he was confronted with demands and hopes
that were beyond his professional capacity. Weinstein’s involvement in
the formation of the settlement renders the interaction between him and
the numerous class members who opposed the settlement all the more
interesting. Weinstein could, of course, let the veterans speak up and just
listen, but he chose in many instances during the hearing to engage,
communicate, and confront their accounts.
For one thing, Judge Weinstein was very clear and open about the
limits and limitations of the law. He kept explaining that many of the
74. Conley and O’Barr observe that in the informal courts they studied judges seldom provided
any cues, such as “yes”, or “I see”, while witnesses were speaking, which leaves witnesses without
guidance as to how long to continue their account. Conley & O’Barr, supra note 28, at 42.
75. Welfare hearing, supra note 39, at 27.
76. Id. at 26.
77. Id. at 41-42.
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veterans’ concerns and demands were beyond what could be achieved in
this lawsuit. “This court is very limited in what it can do,” Weinstein said,
“It’s a court of law. It can only handle a specific litigation.”78 Facing the
objections regarding the level of participation by veterans, Weinstein
openly admitted: “You understand as well as I that the class action is
basically one that denies many aspects of due process [. . .] The class
action is basically an undemocratic way of deciding practical litigation.”79
While he was willing to listen to legally irrelevant accounts,
Weinstein did stress that his decision would be based on the legal merits
and according to the demands of the law. He spoke clearly and openly in
relation to the court’s capabilities and limitations and was equally honest
about what he himself would and would not do in making the decision:
I am here to decide in accordance with the law and the facts as I have
stated it, and I may make a mistake, I am only human. But I will do the
best I can in a decision, but I will not promise you anything. You go
away from this courtroom with no promises and anyone who is in here
who thinks I promised them anything should get that clear. 80

Finally, he stated unequivocally that he was not able to solve all of
the veterans’ problems. 81 But he did offer them something else in return.
Judge Weinstein flew across the country to meet with the veterans (a
fact that did not go unnoticed by the veterans, as one of them said “it
certain meant a lot to me to know that someone could care enough to come
3,000 miles to hear my two or three minutes worth” 82); he would sit as
long as it would take to provide each of them with an opportunity to be
heard. He expressed respect to the veterans and their experiences: “I must
say that it’s a great privilege to have had this opportunity to meet all these
people.” 83 He acknowledged their suffering: “I know that you have been
through a very, very difficult period following the excruciating years that
you’ve had,” he said to one veteran’s wife. 84 The judge was utterly
engaged in their personal accounts: he listened and seemed truly interested
in what they had to say. Francis Hamit wrote about the hearing in Chicago:
Throughout the day, Judge Weinstein remained calm, attentive, and
kindly. He was always interested, and never came down on a speaker.
Some of the speakers were souls in torment who had never said anything
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Agent Orange hearing, supra note 41, at 256.
Id. at 130.
Id. at 117.
Id. at 149.
Id. at 208.
Id. at 144.
Id. at 109-110.
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about the war to anyone. Weinstein could have dismissed such
meanderings as not germane to the issues. He did not. He reacted with
compassion. 85

At the end of the day, though, the judge decided to approve the
settlement even though the majority of speakers were against it (in view
of the size of the class, it was still easy to dismiss those speaking at the
hearings as not representing the majority of ‘silent’ veterans who
presumably supported the settlement). Was compassion enough, then, to
make up for that final decision? Did Weinstein’s relational approach have
any positive impact on participants? Further research is required to
empirically address these questions and the post-litigation perceptions of
litigants. Anecdotally, we saw that some veterans thought that the
hearings were a fixed game, while others were certainly touched by what
they deemed as the court’s willingness to listen: “I thank you, for just
being able to be here and hear all this testimony, 86 and to help.” And,
another stated, “I’m glad, your Honor, to know that your court is trying to
gain some help for the suffering.” 87
Comparing the accounts of litigants in the three hearings based on
their content (table 6) suggests that litigants in the Agent Orange hearing
provided relatively more personal accounts, yet, the findings cannot
indicate whether this was in any way a result of the Judge’s conduct.
Furthermore, comparing the three hearings, the study does not show
a positive correlation between the degree of interaction between
participants and the decision maker and the degree of legal effectiveness
of participation. Judge Korman, in the Holocaust Assets case, who was
the least interactive of the three judges, was nonetheless the most
responsive and open to objections and to the consequent amendment of
the settlement accordingly.
VI. DELIBERATION: BY WHOM AND OVER WHAT? COMPARING THE
ROLES OF LAWYERS AND LAY PARTICIPANTS
The fairness hearing provides an opportunity for direct participation
of lay litigants. At the same time, lawyers do play a significant role in
these hearings. In this study, 33 out of 156 speakers were lawyers.
Furthermore, lawyers were found to provide significantly longer accounts
than did litigants, and to have more interactions with the court (table 1).
Judges engaged more with lawyers when it came to substantive matters
85.
86.
87.
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yet showed more acknowledgment of OPOV towards litigants (table 8).
This finding raises questions as to the roles that different types of
participants played in the hearing and the importance of lay participation
therein.
Comparing the accounts of lawyers and litigants along the features
categorized in the data (tables 4 and 5), yields mixed results. Quite
surprisingly, we find that the frequency of all of the following features
was similar regarding both lawyers and litigants: using direct speech
towards the judge, being ambivalent about the settlement, speaking about
the group, about the future and about the importance of voice. Significant
differences were found, however, with respect to use of legal discourse
(only 7% of litigants and 73% of lawyers); generating legitimacy for
settlement (only 4% of litigants, and 33% of lawyers); speaking about the
past (97% of litigants and 85% of lawyers) and speaking about oneself,
which was found in 89% of litigants’ accounts and only 45% of lawyers’
accounts. A close reading of the transcripts reveals further differences
with respect to participants’ approaches, perceptions, and understandings
of the questions at the heart of the hearing. It also reveals significant
differences between the accounts of class counsel to those of lawyers who
were directly representing litigants. Examining and comparing
participants along the lay versus professional axis is not enough, therefore,
and one should further distinguish the roles of class counsel and other
attorneys.
Starting with the Welfare Case hearing, it is clear from the transcript
that this hearing was not a grand social or public event, especially
compared with the Agent Orange or the Holocaust Assets hearings. The
Welfare Case did not generate the same public attention and did not carry
the same kind of historical disposition as the two other cases. The hearing
seems to lack the drama or high emotions that characterized the hearings
in these two other cases. This is not to say, of course, that the speakers did
not raise significant and emotional issues, nor does it mean that the
concerns brought up in this hearing did not have public consequences.
Some speakers talked about their own personal problems and experiences,
ones that are also relevant to other individuals living with disabilities.
Others made general claims about the way people with disabilities are
treated in American society. They spoke also of discrimination and
justice. And yet, the event did not seem to transcend the personal
dimension of the problems at hand.
Perhaps it was the relatively small number of participants, only
twelve speakers, or the fact that many of them presented a solely personal
account, rather than group-oriented or general accounts (only 67% of
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speakers related to the group in their accounts, compared with 94% of the
speakers in the Agent Orange hearing). It could also be the pragmatic,
problem-solving approach that seems to have characterized this litigation
all along. People came to the court to speak about their problems, about
the great difficulties in living with disabilities, about the inaccessibility of
the Social Service offices and the mistreatment by its workers. Notably,
the one factor that was hardly ever mentioned throughout the hearing was
the law.
Speakers in this hearing can be described along a scale according to
how personal or general their accounts were. Personal stories told in the
hearing included, for example, that of Mr. Rivera, whose papers
constantly got lost by the DSS office; 88 the account of Mr. McLaughlin,
suffering from psychiatric illness, who complained about the benefits that
were insufficient to make ends meet; 89 and that of Ms. Corso, a sixty year
old woman who spoke about her difficulties in finding a job, to name a
few. 90
The more general or group-oriented accounts were also diverse;
some being more related to the legal matter at hand than others. By general
and group-oriented accounts I refer to statements that related to issues,
demands, or concerns that went beyond the personal condition of the
speaker—issues concerning disabled persons or the welfare system more
generally. A clear example would be that of Ms. Goldshin, the
representative of a veterans’ group, who asked the court “to address to the
State that they cannot continue to retaliate against disabled people.” 91 But
class members speaking on their own behalf were also making general
claims: from the history of the welfare system92 through general claims
regarding discrimination 93 and accessibility 94 to arguments concerning
the level of benefits and even a call for civil disobedience. 95 One example
is the account of Ms. Albert. Her following words are very personal, but
they echo deep concerns regarding the welfare system:
A lot of changes need to happen because the Americans with Disabilities
Act passed in 1990 . . . and it’s like, hello, human being here. . . . I am a
human being, deserving of dignity, humanity and respect. I deserve trust

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
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in helping agencies run by this agency as every human being.
My experiences with DSS has been frustrating, full of anxiety, and anger
provoking. It’s also been debilitating, a.k.a. disabling, revictimizing, and
restigmitizing.
Thank you very much for listening. 96

In the Welfare Case hearing, one could compare lawyers and class
members as two distinct groups; whereas, in the Holocaust Assets hearing
it is important to acknowledge the existence of different sub-groups of
participants. With regard to the attorneys in the Holocaust Assets hearing,
there was a clear distinction between class counsel, who were all
supporting the settlement and using the settlement to promote its
legitimacy, and those attorneys directly and independently representing
class members or groups of class members, who presented various views
regarding the settlement.
As for class members themselves, we should note that the Holocaust
Assets class itself was comprised of many different sub-groups with
varying interests. In the hearing, there were litigants representing
organizations which were involved in the settlement process and were
mostly supportive of it. There were speakers representing different
survivors’ groups, a speaker who represented the Association of Roma in
Poland, speakers from Israel, and speakers from Europe. Some speakers
had accounts in Swiss banks or were the heirs of individuals who had such
accounts, while others did not. Some were children during the Holocaust,
and others were children of Holocaust survivors born after the war. It is
only natural in such an immense class action and within such a diverse
class to have diverse views and feelings among class members regarding
the settlement or the lawsuit itself. This was apparent in all hearings
examined here, but the Holocaust Assets hearing was the only one in
which we find clear conflicts emerging among class members themselves.
This was apparent with respect to the question of distribution, as it was
with respect to the question of participation of Jewish organizations in the
management of the case.
Keeping in mind the above-mentioned caveat concerning sub-groups
within the group of lawyers and that of class members, there is still a lot
to be learned from examining, side by side, the accounts of lawyers and
class members. The two groups brought into the hearing entirely different
types of issues and accounts. Lawyers speaking at the hearing did
acknowledge in some ways the non-legal (e.g., historical and moral)
96.

Id. at 50-53.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol52/iss4/4

30

Zimerman: The Case of the Fairness Hearing

2018]

THE CASE OF THE FAIRNESS HEARING

1135

implications and meanings of the case, but they mostly tried to concentrate
on the legal ones. As Burt Neuborne observed, “[A] negotiated settlement
was the best possible way to deal with what is after all a lawsuit, not a
moral question. The moral question is going to be dealt with outside of
this courtroom. We did the best we could, dealing with the legal claims.” 97
It was evident to all participants in the hearing—lawyers and non-lawyers
alike—that the moral questions concerning the alleged wrongs on the part
of the Swiss banks during the Holocaust could not be answered through a
monetary settlement. Yet lawyers seemed to accept this dichotomy—
between law and morality, or law and justice—as a working premise and
focused on doing their best dealing with the legal questions. Class
members, on the other hand, did not limit themselves to the legal
questions, and many actually used the hearing in order to voice the very
same issues that were beyond the legal scope of the case. It was clear that
class members related to the case in broader terms and ascribed to it a
variety of meanings and goals. In fact, many non-lawyer speakers
experienced discomfort with the legal terminology used by the lawyers
with regard to the settlement. Class members resisted the use of the terms
“fair, reasonable, and adequate,” used by attorneys following the language
of Rule 23. A similar resistance was raised also with respect to the term
“closure,” mentioned a few times by the defense attorney, who repeatedly
stated that the settlement “brings about complete closure” to the issues
raised by the lawsuit. 98 In response, Mr. Rechter, who was in favor of the
settlement, said:
It hurt me this morning very much when one attorney after another was
talking about fair, reasonable and adequate. Fair, reasonable and
adequate? And the Swiss lawyer was telling us complete closure. You
want complete closure? Bring me back my father, bring me back my
uncle, bring me back my whole family in Poland. . . . This is a
settlement, but by all means, don’t call it fair or adequate. It can never
be complete closure. 99

Many speakers chose to present their own personal history as
Holocaust survivors or descendants of Holocaust survivors. They spoke
about the ghettos and concentration camps, about survival, and about
those who had perished. Reading the transcripts, one would find moving
97. Holocaust Assets hearing, supra note 42, at 33.
98. Id. at 49.
99. Id. at 101-102. The headline of the New York Times report on the hearing echoes Mr.
Rechter’s words as well. The reporter writes: “An American lawyer for the Swiss banks hit a nerve
when he used the overworked word ‘closure’ to describe the settlement.” See Clyde Haberman, Maybe
a Settlement, Never Closure, N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1999, B1.
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personal accounts, very detailed at times, describing what had happened
to the speakers and their families during and after the war. Speakers
depicted the different concentration camps where they were imprisoned,
the last time they saw their parents, and how they themselves were saved.
Some were speaking about their lives before the war. Overall, the section
of the hearing devoted to class members’ accounts could be described as
highly personal and emotional.
Monetary issues frequently came up during the hearing, such as the
adequacy of the sum settled upon or the right way to distribute the money.
Yet at the same time, many speakers emphasized that the case was not
only about the money. One speaker described the sufferings of the
victims, saying, “It is impossible to estimate it in monetary form.” 100
Another speaker resented the mere attempt to treat these events in
monetary terms: “We don’t see how we could agree that somebody could
buy off and say, we give you so much and forget about it and no claims,
nothing, nothing happened. We [are] erasing the Holocaust.” 101 A probono attorney representing a group of seventy survivors argued, “A lot of
what this case is about is not just the money; it’s trying to restore
individual dignity to survivors. . .” 102 Others saw the lawsuit as restoring
historical justice: “For me, as a Holocaust survivor, what we are doing
here, it is not a question of money. It’s a question that history had proven
right now that Switzerland will no longer be known as a country of cuckoo
clocks, skiing and neutrality.” 103
Another speaker mentioned the therapeutic benefit of the case, which
“brought survivors together to speak with one another, give each other
support, which I think has been remarkably cathartic.” 104 In that respect it
was not only the lawsuit in itself that was significant. Some participants
talked specifically about the fairness hearing as serving important
historical and moral purposes. One speaker said, “I’m sure today’s hearing
will be entered in the history of jurisprudence. I, as a Second World War
veteran, listening to these speeches today, felt like I’m listening to the
Nuremberg process all over again.”
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the hearing did not serve
only symbolic or historical purposes. Many speakers took advantage of
the opportunity to directly address the court in order to present practical
difficulties, concerns, and questions regarding the litigation process. One
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

at 128.
at 137.
at 163.
at 21-22.
Id. at 167.
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speaker complained that the questionnaires sent to class members were
too long and too complicated, which was why many potential class
members did not even bother filling them out and sending them back. 105
Another class member complained about the level to which the class
members were actually involved in the negotiations over the settlement,
expressing the importance of voice: “During the war, we had no voice
over what was happening to ourselves. Now we have amongst us, as you
know, doctors, professors, chairs of Holocaust studies. . . and we think
that the Holocaust survivors should have been involved far more in all the
negotiations than they actually were.” 106
Many speakers related to the question of distribution, although
legally the court was to determine the allocation of the funds only after
the approval of the settlement. For class members, this order of things did
not seem reasonable. The way by which the fund was going to be allocated
seemed inseparable from the question of whether they should support the
settlement, as well as from the question of whether it was in fact a fair and
adequate one. How can individuals actually form an opinion on a
settlement without knowing what the level of the compensation might be?
“A billion sounds very high, very, very much to me, who lives today in
Boston, in subsidized housing,” said Ms. Beer, one of the first to bring up
claims against the Swiss. “But how is it going to be distributed? Who is
going to think about the human beings who are here, who have been
fighting for years?” 107
Other than distribution, another question that seemed to occupy
many of the speakers was the question of legal fees, which were also to
be determined only after the approval of the settlement. Many lawyers
were working pro-bono, but there were a few who asked to be paid for
their work. This generated strong reactions from class members, and many
speakers did not think it was appropriate for attorneys to ask for legal fees
in such a case—especially not the high fees they had demanded.108
Concerns regarding lawyers and their role were sometimes deeper than
the monetary question and related to the very ability of lawyers to
understand, and moreover, represent the class members’ causes. One
example is the Holocaust survivor who said in the hearing, “There are
many lawyers who were never exposed to life in concentration camps, but
105. Id. at 23.
106. Id. at 105.
107. Id. at 54.
108. This question actually continued to generate controversy long after the settlement was
approved. See Menachem Z. Rosensaft, Profiting from the Holocaust, L.A. Times, Nov. 19, 2006;
Burt Neuborne, What Profit? I Gave up $10 Million, L.A. Times, Nov. 19, 2006.
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they write briefs about it. They are very eager to represent us and to make
millions of dollars in the process. This cannot happen. This must not
happen.” 109
The Agent Orange hearing presented the highest rate of opposition
towards the settlement. The disappointment many veterans felt when the
settlement was announced and the tension between veterans’ hopes from
the litigation and its actual resolution were bound to manifest themselves
in the hearing. Many of the Vietnam veterans expressed their sense of
anger and pain. They relived the experience of being betrayed by their
country. It is hard to summarize—or even select from the many
testimonies heard during these two days—stories about physical illness,
emotional distress, mistreatment by the Veterans Administration, ruined
marriages, miscarriages, and disabled children. Veterans did not shy away
even from the most personal and painful of details. More than a few
speakers broke into tears.
Despite the varied testimony, it is nevertheless possible to identify
several repeating themes and concerns. Some of these themes were similar
to those described in the Holocaust Assets hearing above: differences
between attorneys from the management committee and attorneys who
represented individual class members, or the dissatisfaction of class
members with the management committee and the sense that there was
not enough participation and involvement on the part of class members
both in managing the case and in negotiating the settlement.
There were many different reasons provided by veterans for their
opposition to the settlement: some of the reasons had to do with the terms
of that specific settlement, others had to do with the veterans’ wish to have
the case litigated to its end and to have their day in court. Some veterans
thought there was not enough research-based data about Agent Orange to
allow for an informed resolution of the lawsuit. One veteran stated that “if
studies are unfinished and open-ended I feel it foolish to finalize a
settlement of this magnitude.” 110 Others referred to the injustice inherent
in the terms of the settlement, pursuant to which not all veterans would
end up being compensated. “Is it also fair that not every person suffering
from dioxin poisoning will be compensated? Who is going to be the
person that is not compensated? Why will he be chosen and who is going
to tell him why?” 111 Many also thought that the sum of $180 million was
not high enough in view of the size of the class and the severe damages

109.
110.
111.
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Agent Orange hearing, supra note 40, at 356.
Id. at 29.
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suffered by many of them. 112 Others opposed the mere notion that their
suffering could be translated into monetary terms. One veteran, Mr.
Kalama, said, “On the question of whether the fund is fair, reasonable,
how do you put a monetary value on the miscarriage of a child that you
will never be able to hold and love or a marriage that has fallen apart?” 113
While some veterans raised concerns regarding the specific terms of
the settlement, many others said that they would have opposed any
settlement. Like Mr. Taylor who said, “It’s my personal opinion, your
Honor, if you were to award me the whole $180,000,000 personally, I
would not accept it. I want to see the Vietnam veterans in this country to
get their day in court, to get their chance for justice.” 114 Veterans and their
attorneys kept repeating their request that the case go to trial, that they
have their day-in-court: “We would like to have our day in court, I believe,
and we know we run the risk of losing the whole show, but we would like
our day in court. Thank you.” 115
Vietnam veterans, like other tort litigants, sought many things from
the lawsuit other than monetary compensation. They wanted recognition
of their sufferings; they demanded the truth about Agent Orange; they
wished the government would take responsibility and even ask for their
forgiveness; they wanted revenge and justice; and they wanted their
outcry to be heard. No settlement could meet those needs. “We don’t
know,” a veterans’ organizer said is what veterans tell him when he asks
why they oppose the settlement, “we don’t know, and now we’ll never
know the answers.” 116 Another veteran said, “I felt great about the
settlement . . . until I realized that the proof isn’t there. I cannot be a whole
man today unless I have that proof. I don’t want a damned dime if my
little girl dies.” 117 And another veteran stated: “The issue is not adequacy
of settlement. The issue is, and always has been, whether Agent Orange
causes birth defects, skin diseases or any type of internal disorders and

112. Indeed, once the settlement was approved most veterans did not receive any compensation,
and the ones suffering the most serious conditions received very low compensations. The distribution
of the fund was made through two separate programs. The first was a payment program that provided
cash directly to veterans who were totally disabled or to survivors of deceased veterans (averaging
about $3,800). The second program was a class assistant program, which provided money to veterans
through social services organizations. $74 millions were distributed through that program to over 80
organizations working with veterans. The fund closed on September 1997, having exhausted all its
assets.
113. Agent Orange hearing, supra note 40, at 53.
114. Id. at 91-92.
115. Id. at 155.
116. Id. at 95.
117. Id. at 236.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2019

35

Akron Law Review, Vol. 52 [2019], Iss. 4, Art. 4

1140

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[52:1105

cancer.” 118
It seems that many veterans had no faith in the attorneys on the
plaintiffs’ management committee. Veterans’ dissatisfaction with their
legal representation was closely related to their desire to be more involved
in the litigation and to have more control over decisions that had to do
with their lives. Veterans felt that “they have lost their voice” in the
settlement process, and that the hearing was the “only opportunity to
express our views.” 119 Indeed, the hearing itself was deemed and
appreciated by many of the participants as an important opportunity to
speak up and have their input regarding the case. “I welcome this
opportunity here today,” said Mr. Gage, “after waiting 18 years to tell part
of my story on the results of my exposure to Agent Orange in Vietnam. . . .
“ And then, repeatedly, “I thank you for the opportunity, this is the first
time those veterans have had a chance in an orderly manner to present
their problem to the country . . .” 120
The hearing was meaningful for the sake of both the personal and
collective voices. “I am proud to have served my country in Vietnam and
I am proud of my brethren also who have served. We are brothers. Don’t
make us adversaries. We are already divided on this issue of
settlement.” 121 Many of the veterans’ accounts were group-oriented,
raising concerns about the problems veterans were facing coming back
home from war, speaking, for example, about the unique problems
suffered by female veterans, 122 discrimination in employment, or the high
rate of suicide among veterans. Throughout the hearing, veterans
applauded speakers who talked about their painful experiences and
illnesses, they applauded speakers who said they would not give up until
the issue of Agent Orange was brought to court, and they applauded
veterans who talked about the debt of the American government towards
them.
Although various speakers had different perceptions and hopes from
the case, the key word, “justice,” was frequently used by most of them.
They voiced general notions of justice and injustice, fairness, and right
and wrong. Mainly they used the term justice as a synonym for
accountability. Justice, in this respect, meant that the country would
respect, recognize, and properly treat its soldiers, the ones the country was
poisoning while they were fighting its war. “We served this country as
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 34.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 352.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 197.
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they asked us to and I feel that they owe this to us,” 123 said one veteran.
And one of the lawyers said, “We as people and as a government placed
these veterans in an area of danger and we are obligated to help them as
fully as we put their lives at risk.” 124
Perhaps the most poignant account about the injustice inherent in the
settlement was that of Maureen Ryan, who testified with her daughter
Kerry sitting in a wheelchair next to her:
The reality of justice would have included the integrity of a president
who acknowledged Agent Orange as war incurred. The reality of justice
would have found a place in the Washington Vietnam veterans memorial
for the veterans who have died of cancer and the children lost through
miscarriages from this war agent [. . .] so let us not kid each other about
the fairness of the settlement.

[. . .]
How do we put a dollar figure on a young veteran’s terminal cancer or
a child’s twisted body? It is not an easy task, but in America it is the
system we use. This is how Americans settle their differences in a
civilized manner. This is our way of justice.

[. . .]
Kerry, with 22 congenital birth defects, who forever lives in a
wheelchair, who is denied the right to design her own destiny, who will
never know the beauty of making love or marrying some great guy, who
will never know the satisfaction of going to M.I.T. or Harvard, but must
settle for a special education setting gets $14,000 and you talk about
justice? 125

This review of the different accounts of litigants and lawyers in the
hearings breaks down the categories used in analyzing the data—speaking
about the “self” and the group, speaking about past and future, speaking
directly to the judge—into actual stories and details. It reveals the
abundance of opinions, experiences, and emotions expressed throughout
the hearings. Additionally, this review discloses the seriousness and
sincerity with which the speakers approached the court. These litigants,
most of them probably unaccustomed to public speaking, provided
accounts that were for the most part significant and meaningful.
Interaction of litigants with judges over substantive issues, however, was
limited, and such was the actual impact of litigants’ accounts on the
123.
124.
125.
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outcome. Moreover, we see that judges interacted more with attorneys
when it came to substantive issues.
This may raise the question of whether lawyers eventually dominate
the fairness hearings, designed, inter alia, to overcome agency problems
within a class action. This is certainly a valid concern, though we should
also recognize that not all lawyers spoke with one voice. While evidently
all class counsel supported the settlement, other attorneys expressed a
range of opinions and interests. From a class action point of view, this
dynamic reveals the potential of incorporating more attorneys in the
management of class actions and assigning official roles to attorneys who
are outside the management committee. Lawyers who worked directly
with class members were able to bring their clients’ interests before the
court and to present a voice different from that of the management
committee. This demonstrates that it is possible to overcome some of the
agency problems raised by collective litigation through the incorporation
of more lawyers in the process (which might seem counter-intuitive) so
that they can better protect the interests of specific class members.
VII.THE FUNCTION OF THE HEARINGS III: OVERCOMING LEGAL
LIMITATIONS THROUGH A DAY IN COURT
The three cases studied here vary significantly from one another:
they vary in the type of legal claims raised, the personal stories that are at
their background, and the characteristics of the class and of the class
members. One important feature that differentiates the Welfare Case from
the other two cases, for example, is that this lawsuit was not about
monetary compensation, but rather, plaintiffs sought to generate
institutional reform to better address the needs of the class members. This
fact may explain both the role taken by the court in this hearing, the
reactions of class members, and the public nature of the hearing.
The court in the Welfare Case adopted the role of a problem solver,
and from the accounts of the speakers in that hearing, it seems that this
was also the way that they themselves viewed the court’s role. When
compared with the Agent Orange case, there seems to be much less
disappointment, or quarrel with the law, and there was much less
opposition, almost none actually, to the settlement itself. As mentioned
above, half of the speakers in this hearing did not reference the settlement
in their accounts. One possible explanation for that difference could be
that class members in this case, defined as all disabled recipients of
welfare services in Connecticut, were less organized as a group and
probably less informed (legally) when compared with class members in
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the other two cases. Class members in the Welfare Case also did not retain
their own lawyers, as did some of the class members in the other cases.
However, notwithstanding these differing characteristics of the
Welfare Case class, I believe that the significant distinction between the
Welfare Case and the two other cases was that the Welfare Case
represented a nonmonetary claim for institutional reform. It is the attempt
to convey human harm and suffering in monetary terms, which the law
does so routinely—and which was so dominant in the Holocaust Assets
and Agent Orange cases—which fails to take into account and respond to
the great variety of needs and expectations of lay class action litigants. A
case such as the Welfare Case, which attempts—and succeeds— in
bringing about actual changes in the welfare system, seems to resonate
better with class members because it addresses directly some of their reallife problems.
Within this context, the added value of the hearing could be that it
provided class members—who were marginalized both by their
disabilities and by being poor 126— an opportunity to actively and directly
voice their own concerns before an official decision maker. Considering
concerns regarding how a system of welfare benefits fails to acknowledge
the dignity of its recipients and fails to better their conditions in the long
run, but, instead, renders them passive, dependent, and stigmatized, 127 the
opportunity provided in this hearing for individuals to speak for
themselves seems particularly significant. The effects of this interaction
with class members seems to manifest itself in Judge Kravitz’s concluding
remarks:
[A]t the end of the day, I think as everybody who spoke today made
clear, this is all about individuals and one could have the best system in
the world but it really is a commitment to individuals, the recognition,
as Ms. Albert said, that she is a human being, that she’s deserving of
dignity, humanity and respect and she deserves to trust in the agencies
of the State to help her and every other human being as human beings.
That that’s the mission that we all have, who are engaged in government

126. The Two are of course closely related: According to the American Community Survey,
26% of people in the US who identified themselves as having a disability were living under the
poverty line in 2017. Disability Statistics, Online Resource for U.S. Disability Statistics, Cornell
University, http://www.disabilitystatistics.org/reports/acs.cfm?statistic=7 [https://perma.cc/TB38KTK5]. Last visited, February 27, 2019.
127. See Sagit Mor, Disability and the Persistence of Poverty: Reconstructing Disability
Allowances, 6 N.W. J. L. & Soc. Pol’y 178 (2011); Doris Zames Fleischer & Frieda Zames, The
Disability Rights movement: From Charity to Confrontation (2003); Samuel R. Bagenstos, The
Future of Disability Law, 114 Yale L. J. 1 (2004).
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service, including meFalse 128

In the Holocaust Assets case, by contrast, the gap between the kind
of human experiences at the background of the suit and what the law could
do about them was so vast that it seems that all participants acknowledged
that there was no way of overcoming it. Participants repeatedly made the
distinction between legal issues and moral issues, but also seemed to
accept the fact that the case was about the legal questions and could not
do much regarding the related moral and historical ones. The law, in that
case, could offer nothing but compensation, and people were fine with
getting the money (indeed most speakers supported the settlement). At the
same time, they intentionally used the hearing itself to achieve some of
the other goals they were interested in. The hearing seemed to serve as a
public forum in which people could speak about the Holocaust, the
families they lost, and their tremendous sufferings. Class members could
talk about historical justice and morality and about a host of other issues
while recognizing such issues would not be part of the legal outcome. Put
differently, this hearing allowed litigants to have a public conversation
about issues that they thought of as publicly and historically—even if not
legally—significant.
The pragmatic attitude that characterized many of the speakers in the
hearing can be found in Judge Korman’s final decision, where he cited
another court decision stressing that “it must be understood that the law is
a tool of limited capacity. Not every wrong, even the worst, is cognizable
as a legal claim. Indeed, a number of obstacles stand in the path of
plaintiffs’ claims in this case.” 129 The Judge chose to open the decision
with the words of Ernest Lobet, a Holocaust survivor who spoke at the
hearing. Words that, according to the judge, provided the best summary
to his conclusion:
I have no quarrel with the settlement. I do not say it is fair, because
fairness is a relative term. No amount of money can possibly be fair
under those circumstances, but I’m quite sure it is the very best that
could be done by the groups that negotiated for the settlement. The
world is not perfect and the people that negotiated I’m sure tried their
very best, and I think they deserve our cooperation and . . . that they be
supported and the settlement be approved. 130

The Agent Orange case presents yet a different picture. Vietnam
veterans had great expectations and great demands from the legal
128.
129.
130.

Welfare hearing, supra note 39, at 58.
Id. at 141.
Id.
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process—they saw the case as being about all the wrongs they suffered by
the government and society. They wanted their day in court; they wanted
the government to say it did them wrong; and they wanted to have answers
regarding the real affects of Agent Orange. They wanted the court to make
all those things happen. Theirs was the story of the ideal of the American
legal system and tort system. But the story of the law was different—it
evolved around risk allocation, burden of proof, causality, and statute of
limitations, and it ended in a settlement.
The gap between their perceptions of the case and the legal issues on
which it was determined seemed unbridgeable. This was a case in which
there was a real collision between lay demands and legal realities.
Interestingly though, what many of the litigants actually wanted was to
have their day in court. This indicates the veterans’ belief that, in a court
of law, their cause would prevail. It additionally reveals a refusal on
veterans’ part to accept the limitations of the law and, in particular, a
refusal to accept the fact that their case, albeit morally strong, was legally
weak. In some ways, though, the veterans’ expectations and perceptions
of the legal process were not completely unrealistic. While litigation could
not achieve all of their hopes nor fix all of the wrongs inflicted upon them,
it could theoretically provide them with better answers than a settlement.
The disappointment of the veterans was because the law did not live up to
its own aspirations, and it failed to provide the basic legal function of an
open, adversarial discussion of the merits. Settlement is an inseparable
part of our legal reality. 131 It has many advantages, and it could certainly
be that this particular settlement was the most that the veterans could
realistically achieve. What the Agent Orange hearings reveal, however, is
that what most lawyers consider to be a necessary compromise could be
upsetting to many litigants. At the same time, that the class members’
demand for a trial is rejected by their own lawyers as well as the court
reveals how some very basic lay perceptions of the law are similarly
unacceptable to many legal actors.
What Judge Weinstein did that was significantly different from the
two other judges was openly deal with that tension and acknowledge the
non-legal concerns of the class. Of the three judges, Judge Weinstein was
the most honest regarding the constraints of the law in its ability to deal
with the veterans’ claims. He was the most open about the limits of his
own capacity as a judge to actually help the veterans. Like Judge Kravitz

131. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 459 (2004); Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year
Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years War, 57 Stanford L. Rev. 1255 (2004).
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in the Holocaust Assets case, Judge Weinstein did not shy away from
interacting with the class members or displaying empathy. The hearing,
in this case, provided a venue through which the court would address the
perceptions of the class members. This venue seems important, especially
in a case in which, as Weinstein himself wrote in his final decision, the
law was too limited to deal with what were, probably in the judge’s eyes
too, the just demands and needs of the group.
Vietnam veterans and their families desperately want this suit to
demonstrate how they have been mistreated by the country they love.
They want it to give them the respect they have earned. They want it to
protect the public against future harm by the government and chemical
companies. They want a jury ‘once-and-for-all’ to demonstrate the
connection between Agent Orange and the physical, mental and
emotional problems from which many of them clearly suffer. The court
has been deeply moved by its contact with members of the plaintiffs’
class from all over the nation and abroad. Many do deserve better of
their country. Had this court the power to rectify past wrongs – actual or
perceived – it would do so. But no single litigation can lift all of
plaintiffs’ burdens. 132

VIII.CONCLUSION: BETWEEN LEGAL EFFECTIVENESS AND LEGAL
MEANING, BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE
The inclusion of non-legal perceptions within legal procedures may
raise various difficulties and concerns. One significant concern is that the
inclusion of lay perceptions in the form of extra-legal evidence (i.e.,
evidence that is typically or traditionally defined as legally irrelevant)
might have an undesirable effect on the process, in general, and on the
decision maker, in particular. Such evidence may divert the legal
discussion from its rational, facts-and-norms-based nature to include
irrelevant, irrational, and emotional influences. The participation of lay
class members in fairness hearings, as found in this study, may raise very
different concerns. While class members indeed recount stories which are
emotionally powerful and make claims that are morally strong, this study
shows that the hearings have very little impact on the actual legal outcome
of cases. While judges might be moved by such testimony, the complexity
of collective litigation and of the legal claims involved in such litigation
as well as the investment of lawyers and judges in the proposed
settlements all make it virtually impossible to significantly alter the
outcome of a settled class action in a fairness hearing. This distinctive
132.

In re Agent Orange Product Liability, 597 F. Supp. 740, 747 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
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combination of a procedure which, on one hand, allows for the significant
presentation of non-legal accounts, but, on the other hand, does not allow
these accounts to meaningfully impact the outcome, displays its own
unique concerns and objections. The issue is not whether certain evidence
or lay perceptions should be allowed into the legal process, but rather, the
value of incorporating such extra-legal perceptions into a legal procedures
in which decisions are made, at the end of the day, according to the law.
What is the value of what some may refer to as “symbolic” participation
of individuals within mass litigation procedures?
Based on the findings presented in this study, I want to suggest
several different ways in which I find this type of participation meaningful
rather than symbolic. Considering the social, cultural, and historical
dimensions of adjudication, participation in the hearings should be viewed
as meaningful as long as it satisfies the requirements of respect towards
participants and relatively free expression. In addition to satisfying
individuals’ psychological need to be included and heard and allowing
participants to take part in procedures that affect their lives, such lay
participation in legal procedures is meaningful in that it presents an
opportunity for reclaiming legal space and legal discourse. Lay expression
within legal settings is meaningful in that it becomes part of the various
social meanings and narratives that the legal process generates and
transmits.
Examining the value of participation within legal procedures
exclusively through the prism of an actual impact on the final decision
denies the fact that procedures have an array of outcomes, only one of
which is the final decision of the judge. It denies the central role of
procedures in both reflecting and constructing our social world. It ignores
the significance of the social and cultural domains of litigation and of law.
With respect to class actions, it is in the nature of such cases that they
often deal with widespread, common, and often significant social
phenomena (mass torts, institutional reform, discrimination). At the same
time, it is also in the nature of class actions that they often end in a
settlement. It is, therefore, in these cases that deal with significant social
problems—cases that could influence the lives of many individuals and
that involve norms and values—it is in these cases that we often waive
adjudication with all its implications, including truth-seeking, lawmaking,
norm-generation, precedent, public debate, consideration, and reflection
over questions of public significance and interests. 133 The fairness
hearings are significant because they partly make up for that “loss.” In an
133.
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era that does not offer many such deliberative opportunities, the hearings
provide a forum for public discussion; 134 they allow people an opportunity
to speak up and to listen to one another; they bring to the open stories and
facts; they let litigants criticize their lawyers, the courts, and the justice
system. In all of these ways, the hearings fulfill some of the functions of
adjudication—functions that are often abandoned in favor of settlement.
It could be argued that the court is not the suitable arena in which to
hold such non-legal deliberation regardless of its value. Such an argument,
however, relies on a narrow definition of legal process and ignores a host
of functions that courts could and should fulfill. Taking the Agent Orange
case, for instance, it is not surprising it has become “the trial” of the
Vietnam War. The law has this capacity to capture the public attention
and the hopes of those who are hurt. It holds promises and creates high
expectations for those who turn to litigation as a way to remedy social
injustice. It could be the unique role that courts play in the American
culture, or it might also be the deficiency in other public institutions and
forums that could provide opportunities for meaningful public
deliberation and redress. The Agent Orange litigation can be viewed as a
major disappointment for veterans. The hearing itself, however, attained
its purpose: it granted the veterans their day in court—a priceless
opportunity to communicate freely and openly with state authority and
other legal and non-legal actors about the horrors of war and its
horrendous effects.
The underlying assumption of this work has been that the law is a
tool of limited capacity in its ability to accurately and faithfully represent
human reality. The gap between concept and reality is indeed unavoidable
and mostly irreconcilable. At the same time, the law is also an ongoing,
developing project. Legal definitions and categories change and should
indeed continue to change with social and technological developments.
To this end, the boundaries between the legal and the extra-legal should
remain open and flexible. The fairness hearing permits precisely that by
making these boundaries visible and, through challenging them, enlarging
the sphere of interaction between legal and non-legal perceptions, thus
creating opportunities for reciprocal influence of these two spheres.
We have seen that participants attend the fairness hearings to tell
their stories and to voice their views and expectations. These stories are
often irrelevant in mere legal terms, and the participants’ expectations
often go well beyond the limits of the case and the judge’s authority.

134. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Scaling up Deliberative Democracy as Dispute Resolution in
Healthcare Reform: A Work in Progress, 74 L. & Cont. Prob. 1 (2011).
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Those participants, however, do bring the outdoors into the courtroom.
Although this may not alter legal outcomes, the inclusion of the external
perspective, nonetheless, invests the hearings with significant meaning. It
is this inclusion that reveals the tension between what the law is and what
it is not. It creates a dialogue, in other words, between lay actors and legal
actors about the meaning of law, about what belongs to the legal process
and what does not, and about what should and should not take place in a
courtroom. This dialogue forces the court to face lay perceptions and lay
demands. At the same time, it confronts the individuals who participate in
the hearings, perhaps even the public in general, with the realities and
limitations of the legal process. Thus, the dialogue helps to question the
boundaries set by the law. It may present both sides with a new insight
and understanding in relation to the legal process and new possibilities for
what adjudication is and what it could do.
Finally, I wish to address one additional capacity of the legal process.
It is a forum through which private and social history and memory are
constructed. Legal procedures often deal with various versions and
presentations of events of the past in order to produce legal outcomes that
will affect the future. In doing so, legal procedures create a public arena
in which different accounts of history are presented and through which a
social memory is fashioned. “[M]emory, private and individual, as much
as collective and cultural is constructed, not reproduced . . . [T]his
construction is not made in isolation but in conversations with others that
occur in the contexts of community, broader politics, and social
dynamics.” 135 When examining the fairness hearings, a significant finding
emerges: all speakers chose to speak about the past. Presenting one’s own
personal history, or a universal history, seems to have been a desire shared
by all those who participated in the hearings (lawyers and litigants alike).
The accumulation of the various testimonies contributed to the
commemoration of the historic events at the heart of these lawsuits and to
the redefinition of certain events in the collective memory and
consciousness.
The historical potential of the legal process and of the public hearing
was actually mentioned by a few of the speakers at the Holocaust hearing,
but it is true of any legal procedure. The participation of Vietnam veterans
in the Agent Orange hearing and of Holocaust victims in the Holocaust
Assets hearing, as well as the participation of disabled people in the

135. Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, Writing History and Registering Memory in Legal
Decisions and Legal Practices: An Introduction, in: Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, eds. History,
Memory, and the Law, 11 (1999).
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Welfare Case, leaves behind a transcribed record which may be revealed,
read, and studied. In doing so, the participation in these hearings fulfills
the very basic need of so many litigants, which is the need to be heard—
presented so powerfully in the words of Vietnam veteran David McMurry
during the Agent Orange hearing: “For many of us this is the only forum
to say we hurt emotionally, socially, spiritually and physically. [. . .] We
say to you, please at least hear us and continue to hear us and let everyone
hear us.” 136

136.

Agent Orange hearing, supra note 41, at 97.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol52/iss4/4

46

Zimerman: The Case of the Fairness Hearing

2018]

THE CASE OF THE FAIRNESS HEARING

1151

INDEX: TABLES

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2019

47

Akron Law Review, Vol. 52 [2019], Iss. 4, Art. 4

1152

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol52/iss4/4

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[52:1105

48

Zimerman: The Case of the Fairness Hearing

2018]

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2019

THE CASE OF THE FAIRNESS HEARING

1153

49

